Populist Threats to the Peace Process

By Ashley South / Frontier Myanmar | November 23, 2018

The greatest challenge in the peace process is transforming the hearts and minds of the Bamar majority, against the spectre of populism.

WHEN THE National League for Democracy-led government assumed power in 2016, hopes were high for progressive political and social change. However, there has been a disappointing lack of progress so far, not least in the peace process, where the attitudes of political elites form the primary obstacle.

So far, only ten ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) have signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) negotiated under the previous Union Solidarity and Development Party-led government, and fighting continues to rage across Kachin and northern Shan states.

Meanwhile, the much-vaunted political dialogue, envisaged by the NCA as a path towards a Union Peace Accord, has been a great disappointment, with the Tatmadaw restricting sub-national consultations between EAOs and ethnic communities and the Myanmar government and the army refusing to discuss key issues of concern to ethnic stakeholders.

Understandably, in this context, ethnic stakeholders are deeply frustrated. The Karen National Union, one of Myanmar’s oldest and most credible EAOs, recently decided to temporarily suspend participation in joint peace process structures.

In the short-term, there is an urgent need to inject momentum and good faith into the peace process. It could be useful for EAOs to identify a small number of priority issues that could be fast-tracked in negotiations in exchange for the KNU and other EAOs’ continued participation in political dialogue.

These issues could include the recognition of, and funding for, EAOs’ extensive school systems and “mother tongue” teaching in government schools; equitable natural resource management; and land issues, such as the recognition of land title documents provided by EAOs, the revision or suspension of unjust land laws, and compensation and restitution for people who have had their land unfairly taken. None of these demands would prevent others from continuing to campaign for federalism and changes to the 2008 Constitution.

‘Asking for too much’

Interim agreements regarding the aforementioned issues constitute relatively low-hanging fruit that could build trust in the peace process. However, the fundamental problem lies not with specific issues, but with the general reluctance of leaders in the government – and above all the military – to recognise and engage constructively with the grievances and aspirations of ethnic nationality civilians and their representatives in EAOs and political parties.

Since before independence from the British in 1948, urban (predominantly Bamar) political elites have arguably viewed members of ethnic minority communities as second-class citizens – or wayward children – who should accept the leadership of the majority community in building a modern and developed nation. Such patronising and chauvinistic attitudes are most clearly exemplified by the Tatmadaw and its various doctrines, including the “six principles” it insists should guide the peace process.

Notions of identity and political membership in Myanmar are grounded in colonial-era ideas of race, which under decades of military rule have come to frame the possibilities of citizenship. The recent tragedy of the Rohingya demonstrates the damaging effects of essentialist categories of ethnic identity and of restricting full citizenship to officially recognised ethnic groups.

Increasing prejudice against – and the ethnic cleansing of – the Rohingya has occurred in a context where populist-nationalist politics is on the rise. Radical Buddhist monks and others have mobilised communities around uncompromising ideas of what Myanmar is and should be, excluding those who do not fit within their narrow terms, sometimes violently. This populist rhetoric has yet to be mobilised against the peace process, but it could be soon. Already, some in the Bamar community feel that EAOs are “asking for too much”.

To guard against a possible backlash from Myanmar’s ethnic majority, it will be important that Bamar stakeholders feel a sense of ownership and participation in whatever political settlement comes out of the peace process. The risk otherwise is that the settlement would be viewed as a private agreement between EAOs and the government – a perception that could be exploited by populist politicians. There is a need for greater public awareness of the realities underlying the peace process, and of the dangerous and precarious conditions experienced by people living in conflict-affected and ceasefire-governed areas.

The spectre of populism

The risks posed by misinformation, including ‘fake news’, regarding the peace process will likely increase as nationalist politicians seek to outflank the NLD in the run-up to the 2020 general election. Given the present government’s cruel refusal to acknowledge the suffering of the Rohingya, unscrupulous populists may look elsewhere for leverage.

For instance, the peace process could be cast as having “sold out” the Bamar majority and undermined the integrity of the Union, aided by deliberate distortions of what federalism means. In light of this risk, the Tatmadaw Commander-in-Chief’s recent demand that EAOs commit to non-secession (a clause not included in the NCA) is deeply worrying.

As well as stoking concerns regarding supposed reductions in Bamar privileges, populists could also mobilise around the issue of illegal drugs, and exploit popular associations with EAOs. Many people in urban areas tend to associate the peace process with the proliferation of illegal drugs, the trafficking and use of which is often blamed on EAOs (especially ceasefire groups). This is despite many of them having strident anti-drugs policies, in contrast to Tatmadaw-aligned militias.

Unscrupulous politicians could play on widely shared concerns over rampant drugs trafficking and abuse in communities across Myanmar by presenting themselves as strongmen determined to fight a “war against drugs” – in the manner of a Myanmar Rodrigo Duterte, the ruthlessly violent (but popular) president of the Philippines.

The harm posed by illegal drugs, and the lack of attention paid to the problem by the government and its international partners, is emblematic of the chasm between local concerns and the agendas pursued by the state and most aid agencies. In order to prevent a descent into violent populism, it is necessary to address the concerns (and possible misapprehensions) of people not directly affected by the peace process.

There needs to be a national conversation on the nature of citizenship and state-society relations. For this to be productive, both leaders and ordinary Bamar people need to be engaged and exposed to the grievances and aspirations of ethnic communities, and the realities of the peace process – without having their own hopes and fears ignored.