White Paper: Conundrums in Burma

Tim Heinemann, January 13, 2014

Purpose. To identify perplexing issues impacting the prospect of enduring stability in Burma, that, if unaddressed, have the potential to promote enduring conflict between Burmans and Non-Burman Ethnics.

General. The following perspective has been derived from shared viewpoints of various ethnic leaders who are regarded as “hard liners”. This is because of their stance insisting on political reform before opening up Burma to aid and development that they believe is presently playing into Burman power elites’ hands. This group consists of Kachin, Karen, Shan and United Nationalities Federal Council leadership.

Today it has become increasingly unpopular to criticize the fledgling Government of Myanmar (Burma), which needs constructive engagement for an admittedly tough road ahead. This has prompted many in the international community to disregard or downplay compelling ethnic realities that must be faced in order to avoid open conflict. The problem is that the implications of these realities, if openly stated, are potentially devastating to Burman elites in power both overtly and “in the shadows”.

The immediate task in correcting this trend is to contemplate a number of critically important conundrums to be faced in a transparent and candid manner. The complexity of issues thought to have “no way out”, invites needed initiative and innovation that will otherwise not likely take place. It will take international stakeholders to first collectively dare consider what these realities are. Here it is well to ask: Can international good will work hand in hand with international candor or will objectivity about tough issues kill progress today in struggling Burma?

Some would say that it is too late for most of the international community to demonstrate leadership now, because a number of governments have committed to aid, engagement and development policies without first compelling resolution of critically important political and human rights accountability issues. This is fundamentally unprincipled from the viewpoint of long-oppressed pro-democracy ethnics. In this regard, America, which has yet to finally formulate its Burma Policy, may be postured to provide essential honest brokerage from both its public and private sectors. That said, it can benefit by taking into consideration the following perplexing matters that presently prevent good progress for all in Burma.

Conundrums. There are at least seven of these at work today that individually and collectively confound Non-Burman ethnics who are seeking reasonable states’ rights autonomy and balance of ethnic power in the face of continuing ethnic Burman or Burmese dominance.

#1, Rhetoric vs Reality. The Burmese Government must logically play the Reform trump card as baseline Realpolitik in its hope for engaging the West to counter-balance China’s looming dominance. That said, the proven fact is that the government does not control its generals – active, re-clothed and retired, who are still very much in power. The worst case perspective here, according to various experts, is that reformists are only the puppets of unassailable military elites. Regardless of one’s viewpoint on reform as real or ruse, the generals are the sure basis for lack of intended reform by certain Burman power elites, who remain intent on “Burmanization” of ethnics as their Manifest Destiny. The full extent of this conspiracy remains to be confirmed. The reality of it, however, is anathema to professed Reform.

The notion of government “reeling in the generals” goes directly against the fact that empowered generals, who wrote the law and enforce it, are postured by the constitution to assure their own dominance in perpetuity. It is also well to consider their capacity to crush or isolate anyone who attempts to dis-empower them. In other words, while disempowerment and control of generals may be a must, the government can neither constitutionally or substantively accomplish this. There are certainly honorable Burman power elites desirous of reform. Whether or not they are or will ever have a chance to actually be “in power” is now highly questionable.

#2, Follow the Money. Ethnics logically desire for the Burmese Army to cease decades-old oppressive practices and finally withdraw from ethnic ancestral lands owned for almost three millennia. This, however, goes totally against the fiscal reality that Burman generals’ power and the very allegiance of their forces are directly, if not fatally, dependent upon the exact opposite of this – namely, controlling ethnics, ethnic lands and related profit from natural resources, hydro power potential, crippling taxes and extortion. Were generals to withdraw forces from these lands, then they could hardly retain the loyalty of their forces. These have paid a bloody price in the systematic armed theft and control of ethnic ancestral lands since World War II. The army is accustomed to living off both the land and the backs of ethnics after decades of forced labor and oppression fueling the generals’ money-making machine. Ethnics armed resistance has comprised the “just cause” to rally Burmese armed forces justifying their existence to handle internal threats”. An infantry division today is actually a corporate management platform with the capacity to extract both human and natural resources and keep critical trade routes open at gunpoint. There is, thus, scarce logic in super-empowered generals as “armed businessmen” ever giving up this advantage.

#3, Democracy means Death. “Democracy” means “Balance of Power” between Burmans and Non-Burman Ethnics or something close to it. This prospect is fundamentally contrary to what many Burman elites in power would ever let happen. Their worst nightmare now is a modern version of “The Seven Mile Government” when ethnic armies totally surrounded Rangoon long ago. This was Burmans’ “Almost Alamo”. The fear of it is deeply seared into Burman elites’ collective psyche. Given that highly motivated ethnic armies defending their cultures, families and way of life have an enviable track record killing conscript Burman soldiers in disproportionately large numbers, it makes little sense for Burman generals to ever let their adversaries get anywhere close to near-peer status. This is further aggravated by the fact that ethnics comprise approximately 40% of the total population, their lands dominate most of Burma’s borders and international trade routes, as well as host most of Burma’s natural resources and hydro power potential. Democracy sounds pleasingly progressive to internationals, but is frankly too deadly for Burmans bent on dominance to seriously contemplate.

#4, Above and Below the Table Tactics. Armistices and peace talks that resonate so well with the international community are fundamentally used by Burmans “masters” to whip ethnics in line “or else”. The reality is that Burman leaders market their enlightened reformist leadership to the world, while ethnic leaders are crushed under the negotiations table and controlled by corruptive processes in the shadows. It is too impolite to openly call out Burman reformists on this reality. It is also inconvenient for internationals and their newfound agendas to want to ever face this fact – one that anyone who has seriously worked in this region should be acutely aware of. Peace talks are one of the oldest tricks in the books to “look good”, bide time, stall and thereby allow Burman armed forces to quietly re-armed, resupply and harden outposts. While still attacking the Kachin, the generals have installed a system of attack helicopter landing pads in Karen and other ethnic areas still to be dominated. Witness this going on in Northern Karen State, where one of the last major ethnic liberated areas remains. This would all appear rather far from peace. Ironically, ethnics, many of whom bled in armed resistance for the pro-democracy movement in Burma, now find themselves as Outsiders in the eyes of the international community rushing in to embrace Burmans-in-charge.

#5, The Yes and No of International Aid and Development. International businesses and NGOs by their very act of engagement, aid and development of ethnics, nonetheless, wind up empowering Burman elites to further keep ethnics marginalized and subjugated for the long term. This is because Burmans in power are using international legitimacy and related resources to fully and finally penetrate ethnic areas. Here they manipulate ethnic leaders and their communities through services that Burmans themselves are incapable of funding. Health, education and welfare come now to ethnics at a deferred dear price in the form of installation of Burman power brokers, de-credentialing of ethnic bureaucracies, buying off local militias for allegiance to Burmans, imposition of the Burmese language, installation of ethnic population controls, and new ethnic dependencies on international resources which only Burmans may control. In the process, Burmans entrench their own bureaucracies and businesses in ethnic areas, proceed with forced land confiscations and follow quickly with resettlement of Burmans into ethnic areas.

Yes, there is aid and development ongoing. No, it is not really empowering ethnics in the end. Yes, it will eventually result in the systematic destruction of ancient ethnic cultures and ways of life. No, there does not appear to be anyone stopping this from happening. Reality? Aid and Development have become part of Burmese generals’ enduring counter-insurgency strategy. There are two terms that apply here: Sun Tzu’s “Defeat your enemy with a borrowed sword” and the modern notion of attacking one’s adversaries indirectly using “Soft Power”. The combination of the two is ultimately deadly for ethnics in Burma.

#6, The Catch 22 of Internationals’ Duplicity in Ethnic Disempowerment. Ethnic leaders, many of whom championed the pro-democracy cause in Burma for decades, have, over time, become disempowered. This is because international Human Rights and Humanitarian Aid processes bypassed traditional ethnic leadership and their organizations working from exile. The rationale was that these ethnics were deemed “armed groups”. This onerous label made them generally untouchable by the foreign governments and the international aid community of donors. The irony here is that by ethnic leaders’ very act of trying to protect their people, they sabotaged themselves. NGOs avoided helping this leadership and their organizations in favor of channeling human rights and humanitarian assistance directly to ethnic peoples. This was a complete by-pass of traditional leadership creating ethnic peoples’ dependencies on powerful NGOs. In so doing, NGOs enticed the best and brightest ethnics to work for them for salaries that ethnic leaders were and still are totally incapable of matching. The brain drain has been devastating to ethnics’ organizational capacity. Worse, it has destroyed ethnic leaders’ stature and authority. International aid has, thus, been somewhat of a killer.

This has all played perfectly into the hands of Burman generals and power elites. Ethnics now have significantly atrophied bureaucratic, economic and community-level capacities, whereas Burmans have dominance across the board. The final irony is that this now rather complete Burman “dominance through profit making” has been had “on the backs” of ethnics themselves. Many of the same Burman power elites now posture themselves as new-born reformists, with any ethnic bearing arms regarded as rabble “on the fringes” of society. Burmans in power, therefore, now beg the issue that only they can manage current international aid, development business ventures. Worst of all is that there is no accountability for human rights abuses and crimes against humanity perpetrated by some Burman leaders still in power. A “Perfect Storm” of good intentions has now come full circle to assure injustice and ultimate devastation to ethnics. Anyone calling out the international aid and development community on this, is readily bashed, isolated and denied voice.

#7, Balanced Security’s Balancing Act. Much touted Security Sector Reform focused lopsidedly on a Burman-dominated security community will unfortunately ensure conflict in Burma forever. Ethnics intra- and inter- factionalism and lack of capacity, however, work against them in stepping forward to receive America’s and others’ military education and training for professional development on par with Burman armed forces and police. Credible and equitable Security Sector Reform is thereby hobbled by this combination of Burmans wanting to retain dominance with no near-peer ethnics, while ethnics are well behind Burmans because of a system still stacked against them. Stability en route to Prosperity is based on Security that depends on Burman and Non-Burman ethnic stakeholders with totally opposing agendas. This takes us back to the first conundrum concerning profit-making Burman generals’ primacy and dominance.

Comment. Articulating these complex problem sets is not about promoting pessimism. It is instead intended to guide creative analysis of the inter-connectedness of these issues. The danger today with international engagement in Burma is that various initiatives individually look good and brief well in high places. To the extent that they are connected to resolving the above conundrums, then all may be well. Is this the case, though? There is sufficient evidence that Burma is now everyone’s new “just cause” for reasons that range from the altruistic to the most selfish of intentions. Minus a common appreciation of the above matters, there is little likelihood that things will turn out well. Facing these conundrums can bring durable solutions that benefit all. To this end, it is well to consider the following points.

The Center of Gravity (The Hub of All Power). In brief it is this:

Burman generals in power who are untouchable by virtue of constitutional exemption from prosecution, retain dominant military power based on armed control of ethnic lands and the fruits thereof, which then enable monopolistic economic, military and political power.

There is no searching for some other hub of power. All else in Burma is tributary to this one. Dithering elsewhere, consumed with the process of programs, projects and initiatives, is folly.

The Friction Point. While there are many obstacles to progress, only one is dominant:

Ethnics have advantage by virtue of their historical armed struggle, pro-democracy stature and their demographic coverage of half of Burma’s landmass with ancestral lands hosting most of Burma’s natural resource wealth and international trading routes. This gives ethnics credibility to thwart both Burman power elites’ legitimacy and unambiguous armed capacity to impede these elites’ economic development aspirations.

This is directly antagonistic to Burman generals’ intentions for assured economic monopoly as the basis for enduring military and political dominance.

The Tipping Point to Conflict. Ethnics with credible armed capacity may be forced into an irreversible war footing if this happens:

The United States Government opts to favor Burmans-in-power by concentrating IMET (International Military Education and Training) and other security development on strong Burman-dominated national armed forces and security services. This results in Non-Burman Ethnics armed forces being under-developed and not on par with their Burman counterparts.

This would effectively signal Ethnics that Burmans already in power politically and economically, would now have their armed forces (which still have not been absolved for decades of crimes against humanity) super-empowered by US professional development. Ethnics will likely interpret this as their death knell.

Conclusion. All of the above seven issues are linked to Burman generals-in-power as the Center of Gravity to be directly approached and creatively engaged, not avoided as “too hard to contemplate”. This common denominator merits full exploration by all stakeholders in Burma’s future. The main question here is whether there are balance of power options that do not terrify Burman power elites, while also meeting the legitimate rights and aspirations of ethnics for reasonable autonomy, opportunity and prosperity. This must be done in a manner that assures ethnics of protection by their own security forces, while respecting the central government’s right to secure its borders.

At issue is the matter of Burma’s ability to experiment with and embrace more enlightened entrepreneurial practices by which all sides may prosper. This concept of “shared prosperity” is highly risky in this historically Darwinist, winner-takes-all society. The compelling reality here is that Burma should be an economic powerhouse by virtue of natural and human resource wealth, as well as by its strategic location. This prospect of greater prosperity can provide the impetus for change. The need here is to experiment with power sharing on a controlled basis until such time as Burmans and Ethnics come to see they can not only co-exist, but cooperate for common benefit.

The world today is witness to the downside of societies mired in conflict because of sharp, unresolved contrasts between Winners and Losers. Burma need not hasten to join this long list of failures. The spat-on “Loser” vegetable vendor in Tunisia who set himself of fire in utter frustration, and with that act ignited a firestorm across North Africa and into the Middle East, should be ample warning that Burma cannot logically afford to have ethnic “Losers”…particularly those with the unambiguous military might to make mischief.

Tim Heinemann is a retired US Army Special Forces officer, who is a contract trainer for the US Department of Defense in the fields of Conflict Resolution, Counter-insurgency and Counter-terrorism. He is the Founder of Worldwide Impact Now (WIN), a charitable non-profit organization which supports pro-democracy ethnic minorities in Burma.

Point of Contact, Tim Heinemann, tsh5252@hotmail.com, 913 240 1627.